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Introduction
Canadian legal academics have become mesmerized by the seductive dance of the 
Charter. Before the Charter■'s enactment in 1982, Canadian constitutional law was 
a rather arcane subject consisting almost solely of division of powers questions. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the pronouncements of esteemed members of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council on such exhilarating subjects as grain and margarine 
failed to capture the hearts and minds of generations of law students or legal 
academics. As the Bill of Rights proved to be no more than a cruel tease, it took the 
Charter to make constitutional law respectable, indeed popular, in the legal 
academy. However, in its excitement to embrace “the new Constitution”, the legal 
academy has almost wholly abandoned entire areas of constitutional law.
Constitutional law consists of more than the coupling of traditional issues of 
federalism and the newfound infatuation with the Charter. Dicey defined 
constitutional law as including “all rules which directly or indirectly affect the 
distribution or the exercise of the Sovereign power in the State.”1 This definition of 
constitutional law has not shrunk over the years. Peter Hogg defines the subject as 
“the law prescribing the exercise of power by the organs of a State.”2 Yet like long- 
lost relatives, whole areas of constitutional law have been forgotten by the current
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generation of legal academics, ceded almost completely to the political scientists.3 
Issues raising questions about the exercise of executive power once stimulated the 
interest of legal scholars such as Edward McWhinney4 and Eugene Forsey,5 but their 
intellectual progeny have failed to carry the torch.
In this article, I attempt to reclaim a small field of constitutional law which the 
legal academy has let lay fallow for some time. This article addresses the issue of 
succession — the transfer of power from one head of government to another. While 
this issue attracts notable attention abroad, it raises rarely a whisper in Canada. For 
the most part this is because in the 20th century we faced nothing nearing a crisis at 
24 Sussex Drive: no Prime Minister has died in office; none has been impertinent or 
ill enough to resign suddenly; and none has been forced out. However, our luck 
should not make us complacent.
The Prime Minister could die in office tomorrow and the shocking truth is that 
no concrete plan exists to deal with this contingency. While incumbent Canadian 
Prime Ministers cheated death in the 20th century, the experience of other countries6
3 Professor Hogg is a notable exception to this trend with his comprehensive treatment of constitutional 
law. See ibid.
4 See e.g. E. McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution, 1979-1982 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1982) [hereinafter “Canada and the Constitution]; E. McWhinney, “Comment” (1957) 35 
Can.Bar Rev. 92; E. McWhinney, “Letter to the Editor” ( 1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 369.
5 See e.g. E. Forsey, The Royal Power o f  Dissolution o f  Parliament in the British Commonwealth 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968). E. Forsey, “The Courts and the Conventions of the 
Constitution” (1984) 33 U.N.B.L.J.l 1; E. Forsey, “Letter to the Editor” (1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 368.
6 By way of example, four American Presidents have died in office in each of the 19th and 20th 
centuries: William H. Harrison (1841 ), Zachary Taylor ( 1850), Abraham Lincoln ( 1865) (assassination), 
James A. Garfield ( 1881 Xassassination), William McKinley ( 1901 ) (assassination), Warren G. Harding 
(1923), Franklin D. Roosevelt (1945), and John F. Kennedy (1963) (assassination). See A.M. Dodek, 
“When Death Strikes the Nation: The Assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and the Problem of 
Succession” (1996) 19 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 57 at 75 n. 
107 (collecting sources). Three Australian Prime Ministers have died in office this century: J.A. Lyons 
(1939), John Curtin (1945), Harold Holt (1967) (disappeared). See G. Winterton, From Monarchy to 
Republic (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 38. Two South African Prime Ministers died 
in office: J.G. Strijdom ( 1958) and H.F. Verwoerd ( 1966) (assassination). See T.R.H. Davenport, South 
Africa: A Modern History, 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991 ) at 352,367. Two Israeli 
Prime Ministers have died in office: Levi Eshkol ( 1969) and Yitzhak Rabin ( 1995) (assassination). See 
Dodek, supra at 84. No British Prime Minister died in office last century. Two Indian Prime Ministers 
have been assassinated: Indira Gandhi (1984) and Rajiv Gandhi (1991). See “Gandhi,” online: 
Encyclopedia.com < http://www.encyclopedia.com > (last viewed March 18, 1999).
and of ours in the 19th century7 demonstrates that the gates of 24 Sussex Drive may 
yet open for the grim reaper. When death eventually catches up with a sitting 
Canadian Prime Minister, where will that leave us?
We are forced to speculate as to how the interplay of uncertain constitutional 
conventions, untested party electoral machinery, and unpredictable personalities in 
the Governor General's residence and in the governing party would work to produce 
a new Prime Minister. This makes for interesting scholarship but problematic 
politics. It is simply irresponsible and dangerous to tolerate the current situation 
where the Prime Minister could die politically intestate, and thereby create a 
situation where political heirs jockey for power while no one minds the store. The 
office of Prime Minister has become central to the Canadian Constitution. We have 
moved from parliamentary government to cabinet government and, now, to prime 
ministerial government. The idea of the Prime Minister as primus inter pares is passé 
in an era of centralization of power in which concerns are expressed over the Prime 
Minister's autocratic tendencies.8
Two issues must be addressed in crafting a succession plan. First, a contingency 
plan must provide a predictable and reliable response to a sudden departure of a 
Prime Minister. Second, it must accord with current constitutional principles. This 
article attempts to provide a framework for an orderly and predictable succession in 
the event of a sudden vacancy in our nation's highest political office. It will explain 
the current state of uncertainty regarding succession in Canada, relating and 
evaluating the Governor General's constitutional power and duty to appoint the 
Prime Minister. I assert that it is no longer acceptable in Canada for the Governor 
General to exercise discretion in the selection of a Prime Minister, even, or perhaps 
especially, in time of crisis. I then evaluate various proposals for succession and 
argue that the current party rules for selecting an interim leader are problematic and 
that designating an automatic successor to a deceased Prime Minister/party leader 
is the preferable solution. I argue that the Deputy Prime Minister is particularly well 
suited for this role. Finally, I will explain what steps must be taken by the 
government and by the parties to put in place a policy of predesignated automatic 
succession.
7 Sir John A. Macdonald died in office in 1891 and Sir David Thompson died (in Windsor Castle) in 
1894. See Guide to Canadian Ministries Since Confederation, July 11867— February 1,1982 (Ottawa: 
Government of Canada Privy Council Office, 1982) at ix n. 2 [hereinafter Guide to Canadian 
Ministries].
* See B. Wallace, “For the love of power — Is Jean Chrétien a closet autocrat?” Macleans ( 19 October
1998) at 16.
The Current State of Uncertainty
Under the Canadian Constitution, the Governor General appoints the Prime Minister. 
When speaking of “the Constitution,” a point of clarification is required because 
almost the entire realm of relations between the Governor General and the Prime 
Minister is regulated by convention and not by our constitutional documents. Indeed, 
the term “Prime Minister” did not appear in any constitutional text until 1982.9 
Canadian constitutional texts are similarly silent on responsible government, yet this 
principle has been termed “the most important non-federal characteristic of the 
Canadian Constitution.”10 The most basic principle of responsible government in 
Canada is that the Governor General must always act under the “advice” (i.e. 
direction) of ministers who are members of the Parliament and who enjoy the 
support of a majority of members of the House of Commons (MPs).11
Responsible government requires the existence of a government or a Ministry 
which is led by the Prime Minister who is selected by the Governor General. The 
day the Prime Minister dies or the Governor General accepts his or her resignation 
is the last day of a Ministry12 and by operation of law the cabinet as a body ceases 
to exist.13 Unlike American Presidents, Canadian Prime Ministers have no designated 
successors. The Prime Minister does appoint an “acting Prime Minister” to act in his 
or her absence or “in the event of his being unable to perform the function of his 
office.”14.However this appointment terminates upon the death of the Prime 
Minister.15 Moreover, when a Prime Minister dies there is not only a void in 
government but also in the governing party because, by convention, the Prime 
Minister is the leader of the party that controls a majority in the House of Parliament.
9 See Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 37,37.1,49, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11. These sections mandate that constitutional conferences be held on a variety of subjects.
10 Hogg, supra note 2 at 239. See also Reference re: Amendment o f the Constitution o f Canada, [ 1981 ] 
1 S.C.R. 753, 125 D.L.R (3d) 1 at 114 (Laskin, C.J.C., Estey and McIntyre JJ, dissenting) [hereinafter 
Patriation Reference cited to D.L.R.).
11 See Hogg, supra note 2 at 239; Patriation Reference, supra note 10 at 82-83.
]2Guide to Canadian Ministries, supra note 7 at iv.
13 However, the ministers remain in charge of their departments until a new Prime Minister accepts their 
resignations or new ministers are appointed. See ibid. See generally, A. Heard, Canadian Constitutional 
Conventions: Marriage o f Law and Politics (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991) at 49.
14 See e.g. P.C. 1998-2065 (23 November 1998).
15 See J.R. Mallory, The Structure o f Canadian Government, rev. ed. (Toronto: Gage Publications, 1984) 
at 99 [hereinafter, The Structure o f Canadian Government].
None of the parties have designated automatic successors to the party leadership in 
the event of the death of the party leader.16 Thus, when a Prime Minister dies or 
resigns suddenly, there is no Prime Minister, no government party leader, no cabinet 
and no one charged with running the country until a new Prime Minister is 
appointed.
The process of succession under the Canadian constitution has been mired in 
uncertainty for decades. As time passes, various factors combine to compound the 
problem. The current state of uncertainty derives from a combination of several 
factors. First, the role of the Governor General in time of crisis has become murkier 
with the devolution of the Governor's constitutional powers to elected officials. 
Second, Canada lacks conventions or guidelines to address the issue of prime 
ministerial succession because the precedents that do exist are no longer relevant to 
the modem resolution of this problem.
Devolution o f  the Governor General's Powers
The power to appoint the Prime Minister has been termed the most important of the 
Governor General's prerogative powers.17 Dicey explained the prerogative power as 
“nothing else than the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any 
given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown.”18 However, by midway through 
the 20th century, Britain's leading constitutional scholar could state that the 
prerogative power no longer carried the importance that it held in Dicey's days.19 
Moreover, in Canada, the Governor General's powers are also prescribed by the 
Letters Patent which constitute the office.20 Basically, the prerogative power is best
16 In recent years, the Progressive Conservatives and the Reform Party have designated deputy leaders, 
but this position is ad hoc and is not recognized under the Constitutions of the respective parties. See 
Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, Constitution; Reform Party of Canada, Constitution o f the 
Reform Party o f  Canada (adopted at the Winnipeg Founding Convention, October 20, 1987, and 
amended at the Saskatoon Assembly, April, 1991, the Winnipeg Assembly, October, 1992, the Ottawa 
Assembly, October 1994 and the Vancouver Assembly, June 1996 and amended May 28-30, 1998).
17 See Mallory, supra note 15 at 49.
18 Dicey, supra note 1 at 281 -2. See also Hogg, supra note 2 at 15 (explaining that the prerogative power 
consists of the powers and privileges accorded by common law to the Crown).
19 W.I. Jennings, The Law o f the Constitution, 5lh ed. (London: University of London Press, 1959) at 87 
[hereinafter; The Law o f the Constitution].
20 See Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor General of Canada (effective October 1, 1947) 
in M.P. Ollivier, British North American Acts and Selected Statutes 1867-1962 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 
1962) at 653-57; The prerogative powers are properly considered constitutional conventions. See
understood as constituting the circumstances under which the Governor General acts 
without ministerial advice. Understood in this vein, it makes good sense why the 
appointment of the Prime Minister is considered such a power. Given the context in 
which the power is exercised — the absence of a Prime Minister — it is 
constitutionally impossible for the Governor General to act upon ministerial advice, 
since no Ministry exists. However, in exercising this prerogative power, the 
Governor General must recognize the working principles of parliamentary 
government. Normally, the Governor General must call upon the recognized leader 
of the party capable of commanding the support of a majority of the members of the 
House of Commons.21
The Governor General’s prerogative powers22 have diminished considerably 
since Dicey's days. This is perhaps best demonstrated in Great Britain, the 
experience of which it is proper to draw upon because, constitutionally and on the 
basis of the 1947 Letters Patent, the Governor General in Canada holds the same 
position as the Queen in Great Britain.23 In Great Britain, diminution of the Queen's 
discretion occurred through the initiative of political parties. The Labour Party has 
elected its leader since the party's inception in 190024 while the Conservatives 
maintained the approach that the party leader would naturally “evolve” or “emerge” 
to be chosen by the Queen and that person would then be ratified by the Party.25 
Explaining the “emergence theory,” Sir Ivor Jennings stated, “one of the Ministers
Patriation Reference, supra note 10 at 83.
21 See Mallory, supra note 15 at 49; Patriation Reference, supra note 10 at 83.
22 The prerogative powers are sometimes called “reserve powers” because of the notion that they are 
powers that the Governor General holds in reserve for special situations. See H.V. Evatt, The King and 
His Dominion Governors, 2d ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1967); E. Forsey, The Royal Power o f  
Dissolution o f  Parliament in the British Commonwealth (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968).
23 See Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor General of Canada, s. II (effective October 1, 
1947) in Ollivier, supra note 20 at 654; R.I. Cheffins & R.N. Tucker, The Constitutional Process in 
Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976) at 84.
24 See V. Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) at 90.
25 See J.P. Mackintosh, The British Cabinet, 3d ed. (London: Stevens & Son Ltd., 1977) at 429; W.I. 
Jennings, The Queen's Government (London: Penguin Books, 1954) at 134 (stating that the Queen must 
give the party a leader which it is prepared to follow) [hereinafter Jennings, The Queen's Government]-, 
G. Marshall, Constitutional Conventions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) at 29. See also J.C. Courtney, 
The Selection o f  National Party Leaders in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973) at 2 [hereinafter, 
Courtney, The Selection o f National Party Leaders in Canada].
usually obtains pre-eminence, groomed for the post over several years and steps 
almost as of right into the post.”26
However, the potential problems with the “emergence theory” were 
demonstrated in 1953 when Prime Minister Churchill suffered a stroke and his 
acknowledged number two, Anthony Eden, was recovering in the United States from 
surgery. No obvious constitutional method existed to setup a caretaker government27 
to await Eden's return. The Queen's only option— had Churchill died— would have 
been to send for someone she trusted to take the reins and then resign when Eden 
recovered and returned to London. In the end, Churchill recovered and the Queen 
and the country were not forced to face the issue.28 Actual weaknesses of the Tories' 
“emergence theory” were demonstrated in the succession events of 1957 and 1963 
when contrary to the words of Sir Ivor Jennings, no clear successor to Eden (1957) 
or Macmillan (1963) “emerged” and the Queen was drawn into party politics in 
selecting a Prime Minister who then became leader of the Conservative Party.29 After 
the succession episodes of 1957 and 1963, the Conservative Party amended its 
constitution to elect its leader in a similar fashion to that adopted by the Labour 
Party,30 effectively removing the sovereign's discretion in selecting a party leader.31
26 Jennings, The Queen’s Government, supra note 25.
27As none exists in Canada.
28 Bogdanor, supra note 24 at 87.
29 See ibid. at 93-99; A. Sampson, The Anatomy o f Britain Today (London: Houghton and Stoughton, 
1965)at 34.
30 See S.D. Bailey, British Parliamentary Democracy, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971 ) at 
17; C. Vincenzi, Crown Powers, Subject and Citizens (London and Washington: Pinter, 1998) at 74.
31 Thus, priorto 1965, the Queen exercised real discretion, at least regarding Conservative leaders. Since 
1965 when both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party made provisions for replacement of leaders 
for whatever reasons, the monarch waits until selection of new party leader upon whom she calls to form 
a government and become the Prime Minister. See Bogdanor, supra note 24 at 84. Currently in Great 
Britain, the Queen has no discretion even to appoint an interim Prime Minister when the Labour Party 
is in power because Labour Party rules stipulate that if there is a vacancy in the office of the party leader 
while the party is in government, the cabinet appoints a minister as interim leader until a new leader is 
chosen. See R. Brazier, Constitutional Practice, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 12 n.20. It 
is possible that in the case of the death of a Conservative Prime Minister in Great Britain, the Queen 
could still have some discretion in selecting an interim Prime Minister until the party selected a new 
leader.
While in Britain, the parties restricted the practical exercise of the royal 
prerogative,32 a similar diminution of prerogative powers has taken place in Canada. 
However, the restriction occurred earlier, with 1896 marking the turning point at 
which the governing party in Canada asserted its right to select its own leader.33 Prior 
to that year, Canada had followed the British model and the parties deferred to the 
wishes of the Governor General in selecting a new leader for the country and for the 
party.34
It is still debated within Canada whether the Governor General may ever 
exercise prerogative powers and act without the advice of ministers. Conventional 
wisdom maintains that the 1926 King-Byng affair, which saw the Governor General 
refuse the Prime Minister's request for a dissolution of parliament, establishes the 
convention that the Governor General cannot refuse to act on the advice of the Prime 
Minister.35 However, others contest this view, taking a more narrow interpretation 
of the King-Byng affair and asserting that it established a convention only that a 
foreign Governor General could not refuse the advice of government, implying that 
a Canadian Governor General could do so.36 While Canadian commentators continue 
to debate the existence and the scope of prerogative powers,37 other Commonwealth 
scholars have declared them effectively dead.38 Whether the Governor General
32 See Courtney, The Selection o f National Party Leaders in Canada, supra note 25 at 8-9.
33 Ibid. at 39; J.C. Courtney, Do Conventions Matter? Choosing National Party Leaders in Canada 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995) at 6 [hereinafter Courtney, Do 
Conventions Matter?].
34 See Courtney, The Selection o f National Party Leaders in Canada, supra note 25 at 31 -32 (noting that 
the Governor General consulted with party leaders but still maintained some latitude of discretion).
35 See Me Whinney, Canada and the Constitution, supra note 4 at 130.
36 See ibid. See also Heard, supra note 13 at 34-40 (on refusal of advice).
37 See e.g. E. Forsey, ‘The Courts and the Conventions of the Constitution,” supra note 5; E. 
McWhinney, “Comment” ( 1957) 35 Can. Bar. Rev. 92; J.R. Mallory, “Letter to the Editor” ( 1957) 35 
Can. Bar. Rev. 242; E. Forsey, “Letter to the Editor” (1957) 35 Can. Bar. Rev. 368; E. McWhinney, 
“Letter to the Editor” ( 1957) 35 Can. Bar. Rev. 369. In the Patriation Reference, supra note 10 at 83,the 
Supreme Court appeared to recognize that some prerogative powers could be exercised without 
ministerial advice (“Most of the powers of the Crown under the prerogative are exercised only upon the 
advice of the Prime Minister or the cabinet”) [emphasis added].
38 See S. Encel, Cabinet Government in Australia, 2d ed. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1974) at 22 (stating that apart from Canada, the principle of Crown discretion has long been a lost 
cause); G. Carpenter, “Prerogative Powers — an anachronism?” ( 1989) Comparative and International 
L. J. of South Africa 190. But see F.M. Brookfield, “The reconstituted office of Governor-General” 
1985 New Zealand L. J. 256 at 258-59 (arguing that the Governor General's prerogative powers may be 
resorted to by the Crown to save the country from apprehended constitutional chaos). Writing a year
retains discretion to appoint a Prime Minister in the case of a sudden vacancy in that 
office will be evaluated in detail below.
The Lack o f  Relevant Precedents
While no Prime Minister has died in office last century, two did in the 19th century. 
When Sir John A. Macdonald died on June 6,1891, he left no obvious successor.39 
After consulting with Conservative party leaders, the Governor General called upon 
Sir John Abbott on June 15,1891 to form a new government and the fourth Ministry 
in our nation's history was sworn into office the next day.40 Just over two years later, 
Sir John Thompson, who had succeeded Abbott as Prime Minister on December 5, 
1892, died suddenly while visiting Windsor Castle on December 12, 1894. The 
Governor General refused to call upon Thompson's most obvious successor, Sir 
Charles Tupper, because of his personal aversion to Tupper.41 Instead, acting almost 
immediately, the Governor General called upon Sir Mackenzie Bowell to form a 
government the day after Thompson's death.42 In so choosing Bowell, the Governor 
General foisted his choice on the party and on the country. Bowell held power for 
16 months before he was turfed out of office by his own party and Tupper became 
Prime Minister.43
These historical precedents are no longer applicable to modem Canada because 
the Governor General no longer wields the power that the position had in the 1890s. 
Political parties are much more central to Canadian politics today. The Thompson 
succession neatly presents the Catch-22 position that a modem day Governor
before the constitutional crisis in his country which would see the Governor General dismiss the Prime 
Minister, Encel states, “Canadian political scientists and constitutional lawyers are prone to assert the 
need for the vice-regal prerogative much more than are their Australian counterparts. This may reflect 
the absence of an effective labour party in Canada, a history of demagogic premiers and prime ministers 
(“chieftains”), and greater opportunities for political jobbery in making appointments to official 
positions.” Encel, supra at 21.
39 Courtney, The Selection o f National Party Leaders in Canada, supra note 25 at 34.
40 See Guide to Canadian Ministries, supra note 7 at 22; Courtney, Selection o f National Party Leaders 
in Canada, supra note 25 at 34.
41 See R.M. Punnett, The Prime Minister in Canadian Government and Politics (Toronto: Macmillan, 
1977) at 33; Courtney, Selection o f National Party Leaders in Canada, supra note 25 at 37.
42 Guide to Canadian Ministries, supra note 7 at 30. The Ministry assumed office on December 21, 
1894.
43 See Courtney, Selection o f National Party Leaders in Canada, supra note 25 at 37-39; G. Donaldson, 
Eighteen Men: The Prime Ministers o f  Canada (Toronto: Doubleday, 1985) at 52-57.
General would face in the case of the sudden death of a Prime Minister in office. On 
the one hand, a Governor General who acts quickly to put a government in place 
preempts the party's choice of leader and undermines the principle of democratic 
accountability that has become a hallmark of Canadian democracy. On the other 
hand, a Governor General who waits for a party to select a new leader may violate 
his constitutional duty to ensure that a Prime Minister is always in place.44 Moreover, 
the existence of a gap, a temporary power vacuum in national leadership, may have 
the potential to wreak real damage on the country. One can only speculate on the 
fright that would result if the Prime Minister were to die during a referendum 
campaign with the concomitant plummeting of the Canadian dollar.45 Stuck between 
a rock and a hard place, what is a Governor General to do?
There is No Plan
In a word, our government has no succession plan. The Privy Council Office which 
is responsible for the machinery and continuity of government, has no contingency 
plan.46 Nor does it appear that the construction of a plan is in the works by anyone 
in Ottawa. When asked, the Privy Council Office returns to the traditional role of the 
Governor General to select the Prime Minister.47 The Canadian people would 
probably be shocked if their Prime Minister followed John Major’s recent lead to 
rise in the House of Commons and tell the nation that no plan existed for dealing 
with the death of a Prime Minister in office.48
The Case for Governor General Discretion
Professor Mallory’s is the classic statement on the power of the Governor General 
to appoint the Prime Minister: “the governor acts on his own authority and with
44 See Mallory, The Structure o f  Canadian Government, supra note 15 at 49-50.
45 Heads of State of other countries have not escaped criticism for their attempts to involve themselves 
in internal party politics. See B. Tsur, “Weizman denied meddling in elections” Jerusalem Post (31 
December 1998)online: < http://www.jpost.com/News/Article-5.html > (last visited December 31, 1998) 
(reporting that Israel's President had interfered in the electoral process by trying to influence two party 
leaders to run together so as not to divide the Left).
46 Letter from N. Jauvin, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Machinery of Government) (Privy Council 
Office) to Adam Dodek (7 February 1996); Letter from David C. Elder, Assistant Secretary to the 
Cabinet (Machinery of Government) (Privy Council Office) to Adam Dodek (8 December 1998).
47 Ibid.
48 See Brazier, supra note 31 at 76 and n.41.
complete freedom in finding a Prime Minister who can govern and who is capable 
of claiming the allegiance of a body of disciplined followers within the legislature.”49 
Those who believe that life still breathes through the corridors of Rideau Hall begin 
by noting that the Governor General is responsible for seeing that the country is 
never without a Prime Minister:50 “The right and the duty to find a Prime Minister 
if that office becomes vacant is the most important single function of the Governor 
General.”51 Scholars recognize that the Governor General's choice is effectively 
constrained so long as the governing party has a leader. Our problem exists because 
the party rules do not directly address the contingency under study. Thus, while it 
may be “the constitutional duty of the Governor General to take the initiative in 
finding a Prime Minister if the one in office dies or becomes incapable of 
performing his duties,”52 the question remains whether the Governor General pre­
empts party leaders or waits for them. Some scholars seem to suggest that the 
Governor General maintains an active and independent role and selects a new leader 
who should then be confirmed by party leaders.53 Indeed, the question is asked, 
“[w]hy should not a Canadian Governor General who is both a Canadian citizen and 
also effectively appointed by the government of Canada exercise the reserve, 
discretionary, prerogative powers conferred upon him by the BNA Act (sections 50 
and 54-7)?”54 Moreover, it is argued that the Governor General has a personal and 
independent role to play as part of a system of checks and balances, and that the 
Governor General should exercise the office's legal powers if in his or her own 
constitutional judgment the need so arises.55
49 J.R. Mallory, “The Royal Prerogative in Canada: The Selection of Successors to Mr. Duplessis and 
Mr. Sauvé” (1960) 26 Can. J. of Economy and Political Science 314 at 314.
50 See J. Monet, The Canadian Crown (Toronto/Vancouver: Clarke, Irwin & Co., 1979) at 53; R.I 
Cheffins & R.N. Tucker, The Constitutional Process in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 
1976) at 84.
51 Mallory, supra note 15 at 49-50.
521bid.
53 See ibid. at 51 (stating that it is the Governor General's task under the Constitution to find a successor 
and that he is entitled to the full support of the party leaders in his choice). See also Punnett, supra note
42 at 33-34 (stating that the Governor General might have to be involved in the selection of a new leader 
until a party convention is held).
54 McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution, supra note 4 at 130. Professor McWhinney answers his 
own question in the affirmative. See ibid. at 130-31.
55 See ibid. àt 130. E. Forsey, “No ‘figurehead’ — Govemor-General's Duties and Powers clear” The 
Citizen (23 January 1974) at 6 (stating that Governor General would play a part in deciding who should 
be the Prime Minister).
The case for continued Governor General discretion is most forcefully 
articulated by scholars such as Professors Mallory and Ward, who take very 
seriously the Governor General's constitutional duty to ensure that there is always 
a Prime Minister and a responsible cabinet in office.56 According to Professor Ward, 
upon the sudden death or resignation of the Prime Minister, it is the Governor 
General's task to take the initiative and “pursue the matter unceasingly until a new 
prime minister is in office.”57 Naturally, the Governor General would consult with 
party leaders,58 but in the end the decision would be the Governor's alone. For these 
scholars, the bottom line is that, just because the Governor General has not been 
called upon to assume this duty since 1894, there is no reason to assume that the 
power has somehow declined or disappeared in the interim.59
Professor Mallory champions the flexibility of the Canadian model in contrast 
to the rigidity of automatic succession, as best exemplified by the American 
Constitution.60 Taking “pot shots” at the American vice presidency is a relatively low 
cost exercise. However, Professor Mallory's concerns are not well taken. To begin, 
the Governor General is no longer in a position “to pick the best man” for the job 
and has not been, at least since 1894 when the Conservative Party asserted its right 
to select its leader, rather than accept the Governor General's choice for party 
leader/Prime Minister.61 Certainly, the Governor General has not been able “to pick
56 “The right and the duty to find a Prime Minister if that office becomes vacant is the most important 
single function of the Governor General.” Mallory, The Structure o f Canadian Government, supra note
15 at 49-50.
37N. Ward, Dawson's The Government o f Canada, 6lh ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) 
at 183. See also Mallory, The Structure o f  Canadian Government, supra note 25 at 49-50.
58 Ward, supra note 57 at 183.
59 Ibid. at 184. See also McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution, supra note 4 at 130 (stating that most 
of the arguments for the alleged disappearance of the reserve discretionaiy powers of the Governor 
General stem from examples that no longer seem applicable to the current Canadian situation. For 
example, McWhinney asserts that the 1926 King-Byng affair should be more correctly viewed as 
confirming a convention that a non-Canadian Governor General could no longer resist the advice of the 
Canadian government, rather than standing for the proposition that the Governor General cannot, even 
in limited circumstances, disregard the advice of the government and exercise his or her own 
independent constitutional judgment).
60 See Mallory, supra note 15 at 50.
61 See Courtney, Selection o f National Party Leaders in Canada, supra note 25 at 39. As Professor 
Courtney explains, in 1896 the Conservative Party was weak and divided under Prime Minister Bowell 
and reached a crisis point when seven ministers resigned, demonstrating their lack of confidence in 
Bowell and their desire to have Sir Charles Tupper lead the party (and the country). Bowell attempted 
to resign but the Governor General, Lord Aberdeen, was determined not to call upon Sir Charles. Bowell
the best man” since formal leadership election mechanisms were established by the 
parties, for the Liberals in 1919 and the Conservatives in 1927. The idea of the 
monarch “choosing the right man” laboured on in Great Britain until 1965, but it is 
an idea whose time has passed.
Moreover, concern expressed over the quality of American Vice Presidents, 
emphasizing how they are often chosen to “balance the ticket” rather than for the 
leadership qualities,62 is also misplaced. An American Vice President who becomes 
President serves the portion remaining of the President's term, whether that is 3 
years63 or a few months.64 An interim Prime Minister would not serve out the balance 
of the government's term of office (unless elected to do so by the party selection 
machinery); rather she or he would shepherd the country for several months while 
the governing party conducted its leadership selection process. The Canadian people 
would not have a Prime Minister foisted upon them for several years who did not 
lead the governing party in the prior election campaign. In all likelihood, the new
again attempted to resign, without success and a stalemate ensued which was broken through a face- 
saving compromise whereby Bowell would retain the premiership until the end of the parliamentary 
session (some four months away) during which time Tupper would enter the House of Commons and 
assume effective control of the party and then be named Bowell's successor as Prime Minister. This turn 
of events leads Courtney to term 1896 “a key year in Canadian party politics, in so far as the governing 
party asserted with some success a claim to choose its own leader (even though he may not, in fact, 
become prime minister) independent of vice-regal wishes.” Ibid. The Governor General did in fact call 
upon Tupper when Bowell stepped down. Ibid. at 40. However, Tupper's tenure was short lived, lasting 
May 1, 1896 to July 8, 1896. See Guide to Canadian Ministries, supra note 7 at 36. In the end, Lord 
Aberdeen probably felt vindicated in his obstinacy. Strictly speaking, the Prime Minister need not be 
a party leader to lead a Ministry, so long as she or he has the support of the Legislature. It is possible 
that a national leader could exist who is “above” party politics and may be called upon to lead the 
nation, such as was the case in Great Britain in 1940 with Winston Churchill. To be precise, the 
convention requires the Governor General to appoint a person as Prime Minister who has the support 
of the Legislature. See Patriation Reference, supra note 10 at 82-83. “[I]n practice this means in most 
cases the leader of the political party which has won a majority of seats at a general election.” Ibid. I am 
indebted to Professor Courtney for pointing this out to me.
62 See Mallory, supra note 15 at 50.
63 As was the case when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt died in July 1945 and Harry Truman 
served out the balance of his term until the Presidential election of November 1948 (which re-elected 
Truman). See online: “The Presidents of the United States,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
WH/glimpse/presidents/ html/presidents.html> (last visited February 4,1999).
64 The shortest balance remaining in a term assumed by a Vice President appears to be more than one 
year, the time remaining left in John F. Kennedy's term of office when he was assassinated in November 
1963 with an election a year away. See online: “The Presidents of the United States,” 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/glimpse/presidents/ html/presidents. html> (last visited February 4,
1999).
leader/Prime Minister, whether or not that person was the same person as the interim 
leader/Prime Minister, would feel compelled “to go to the people” and seek a fresh 
mandate within a few months time.65
The case for continued Governor General discretion contains empirical and 
normative arguments. Empirically, there is no question that our Constitution assigns 
the Governor General the responsibility, indeed the duty, to appoint the Prime 
Minister. The debate concerns how the Governor General should assume this 
responsibility and whether any discretion should be exercised. As discussed above, 
the powers and the discretion of the Governor General have diminished considerably 
since 1896. In the next section, I offer a normative argument, based on a present-day 
understanding of the operation of the Canadian Constitution, as to why the Governor 
General should no longer exercise discretion in appointing a Prime Minister when 
a sudden vacancy arises.
Our Constitution for the Next Century
I have described the process of devolution of power from the Governor General to 
elected officials over the last century. In effect, a very strong constitutional 
convention now exists that the Governor General must call upon the leader of the 
party who controls a majority in the House of Commons. The core problem in a 
succession crisis is the vacancy in the governing party's leadership— with no leader, 
the Governor General has no one to turn to. Empirically, numerous constitutional 
conventions guide any understanding of the operation of succession in Canada. 
Normatively, I submit that there are various constitutional principles which should 
guide decision makers, particularly the Governor General and the governing party, 
in a succession crisis.
An understanding of how succession should operate must be guided by the 
current understanding of “the democracy principle.” On several occasions, the 
Supreme Court has recognized this principle as one of the normative underpinnings
651 realize that it is possible that the new leader who would become Prime Minister would be a person 
who by definition (since the party leader is deceased) did not lead the party in the prior election. 
Hypothetically, this person could serve out the balance of the deceased leader's mandate. However, it 
is arguable that a convention has developed whereby a new party leader who becomes Prime Minister 
must, within a reasonable time after his or her ascendancy to the premiership, call a national election to 
seek a mandate from the people for his or her leadership as did Pierre Trudeau in 1968, John Turner in 
1984 and Kim Campbell in 1993. See “Capital Confidential” Macleans (8 February 1999) 12.
that guide the exercise of constitutional authority in this country.66 “[T]he democracy 
principle can best be understood as a sort of baseline against which the framers of 
our Constitution, and subsequently our elected representatives under it, have always 
operated.”67 The democracy principle mandates that the powers of the state be 
exercised in accordance with the wishes of the electorate.68
Although the Court has not fleshed out a complete understanding of democracy 
under the Canadian Constitution, it has acknowledged an evolutionary process of 
Canadian democracy which has seen the country move towards more effective 
representation: “[0]ur constitutional history demonstrates that our governing 
institutions have adapted and changed to reflect changing social and political 
values.”69 Moreover, it has stated that the legal framework of the Constitution should 
be operated “in accordance with the prevailing constitutional values or principles of 
the period.”70 Various “prevailing principles” can be identified which should inform 
the exercise of the Governor General's prerogative power.
Recent political events demonstrate a continuing process of evolution in Canada 
towards greater openness and participation in politics. The trend is manifestly away 
from the closed-room elite decision-making that the Governor General's selection 
of a Prime Minister after an incumbent's death would surely be. The successful 
constitutional reform in 1982 was brought about through unprecedented public 
participation in government and through testimony before Joint Committee of the 
House of Commons that bestowed popular legitimacy on the patriation process.71 
Conversely, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord has been attributed to the revival 
of executive federalism and government’s failure to involve Canadians in the
66 See Patriation Reference ^ supra note 10 at 84; Reference re Secession o f  Quebec, [ 1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 
at para. 32, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at 403 (hereinafter Quebec Secession Reference cited to D.L.R.). 
Although the legal effect of these constitutional principles remains murky, it is clear that they have 
normative appeal as to how our constitution should operate. See ibid. at 411 (the constitutional 
principles are invested with a powerful normative force and are binding upon both courts and 
governments). I restrict my argument to one as how the Governor General should exercise authority 
rather than asserting that he or she is compelled to exercise this power in a particular manner.
67 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 66 at 414.
68 Patriation Reference, supra note 10 at 84.
69 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 66 at 414.
70 Patriation Reference,supra note 10 at 84.
71 See P. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) at 115.
constitutional process.72 Learning this lesson, the government involved many non­
governmental groups in the Charlottetown Round and eventually held a national 
referendum on that Accord. High profile public inquiries into tainted blood, military 
malfeasance in Somalia and the APEC Conference are further indications of the 
public demand for transparency and accountability in governmental action. At the 
same time, political parties are continuing down the path of democratization73 with 
both the Progressive Conservative Party and the Reform Party now holding direct, 
membership wide, voting for their leaders. The trend is toward greater openness, 
responsibility and participation in Canadian politics. It is in light of these 
developments that the Governor General's role must be evaluated.
As the Governor General's powers have diminished, the office has become more 
politicized, strongly militating against a role for the Governor General in times of 
crisis. Canada's first Governors General were appointees from Westminster. 
Although they were political appointees, our first Governors General were 
independent of or “above” Canadian party politics. Certainly, no Governor General 
in Canada's first fifty years was in any way beholden to Canadian politicians for his 
appointment. This situation changed after the King-Byng crisis in 1926. After the 
Imperial Conference that followed in the aftermath, the British agreed that all future 
Governors General would be appointed upon the advice of the dominion 
governments. From 1926 until 1952, Canadian Prime Ministers selected Governors 
General from a list of British candidates submitted to them from London.74 
Eventually the process evolved from consultation.in the appointment of the 
Governor General to selection of the Governor General by the Prime Minister, with 
the official appointment being made by the Queen.
While the Canadianization of the Governor General's office began with the 
King-Byng crisis in 1926, it would take another 25 years until a Canadian occupied 
the office, with the appointment of Vincent Massey in 1952. The first truly Canadian 
Governors General were non-partisan; they were diplomats and soldiers. Vincent 
Massey (1952-57) was a diplomat and businessman who was an acknowledged 
leader in cultural and educational affairs. He had a previous brush with politics, but
72 See e.g. P. Monahan, Meech Lake: The Inside Story (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991 ) at
6.
73 See generally Courtney, Do Conventions Matter?, supra note 33 at 233 et seq.
74 See Heard, supra note 13 at 17.
it was sufficiently unsuccessful and distant as to be overlooked.75 Mr. Massey was 
followed by General Georges Vanier (1959-67) who was a professional diplomat 
and a soldier with a reputation for integrity.76 Although Roland Michener ( 1967-74) 
was a former Speaker of the House of Commons under the Conservatives, his 
appointment by Liberal Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson as High Commissioner to 
India was considered sufficient to nullify his political affiliation.77 The tenure of 
Jules Léger (1974-79), a career diplomat and civil servant marked the end of non­
partisan appointments to Rideau Hall.78
The wholesale politicization of the Governor General's office was initiated by 
Pierre Trudeau. In 1979, Mr. Trudeau appointed former NDP premier of Manitoba 
Edward Schreyer (1979-84) to the post. At first glance, the appointment of an NDP 
premier by a Liberal Prime Minister has the hallmarks of a non-partisan 
appointment. Yet it appears that Mr. Schreyer was appointed to the post less because 
of his prior service to the country than because of Trudeau's belief that Schreyer 
could be helpful in a projected national unity campaign.79 Mr. Trudeau's appointment 
of Mr. Schreyer inaugurated the practice of appointing politicians to Rideau Hall. 
The appointment of Jeanne Sauvé (1984-90), a former Liberal cabinet minister and 
distinguished Speaker of the House, continued the tradition.80 Mr. Mulroney carried 
on where Mr. Trudeau left off, taking partisanship a step further by appointing 
Raymond Hnatyshyn (1990-95) to Rideau Hall.81 Upon his assumption of the
75 See F. MacKinnon, The Crown in Canada (Calgary: McClelland & Stewart, 1976) at 95.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 See J. Gray, “How the honour lost its glory” The Globe and Mail (24 November 1994) A21. Whatever 
Mr. Trudeau's hopes were for the role that Mr. Schreyer would play as Governor General during a 
national unity campaign, they backfired. In a remarkable statement while he was still in office, Mr. 
Schreyer expressed his willingness to use the powers of the Governor General's office to prevent Mr. 
Trudeau from embarking upon unilateral patriation of the Constitution. See “Schreyer Would Have 
Blocked Forced Patriation” The Globe and Mail (22 January 1982) 8.
80 The former Liberal politician did not escape run-ins with Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
who was elected to office during her tenure. See S.E. Woods, Her Excellency Jeanne Sauvé (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1986) at 217-19 (describing the clash between Sauvé and Mulroney over the Shamrock 
Summit in Quebec City).
81 A loyal Mulroney supporter and former Justice Minister who lost his seat in the 1988 election, Mr. 
Hnatyshyn was considered an ineffectual minister. See E. Nielsen, The House is Not a Home (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1989) at 309 (evaluation by former Deputy Prime Minister and cabinet colleague of Mr. 
Hnatyshyn); The Mulroney Team (Don Mills, Ont.: Corpus Information Services, 1984) at 39. On Mr.
premiership, Jean Chrétien reinforced the notion of the Governor General's job as 
a political plum with his appointment of longtime supporter, Liberal MP and cabinet 
minister Roméo LeBlanc ( 1995-) to the post. Mr. LeBlanc's appointment marked the 
first time in Canadian history that open criticism was voiced regarding the Prime 
Minister's selection for Governor General.82
As the Governor General's position has become more politicized, converted into 
a patronage reward for loyal party leaders, its legitimacy as an office capable of 
exercising independent political judgment in times of crisis has been undermined. 
Paradoxically, the office had more legitimacy in terms of the exercise of independent 
judgment before it became “Canadianized” and its occupants were not beholden to 
the Prime Minister for their appointment. The appointment process makes the notion 
that the Governor General might play a non-partisan role untenable.83 It simply 
cannot be said that a Governor General laden with political baggage could maintain 
“the most conscientious disinterestedness and impartiality toward Canadian political 
affairs,”84 especially when it comes to a matter at the heart of party politics, the 
accession to the party and national leadership.85 The appointment of Adrienne
Hnatyshyn's problems as Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources in the short-lived ministry of Joe 
Clark, See J. Simpson, Discipline o f  Power: The Conservative Interlude and the Liberal Restoration 
(Toronto: Personal Library, Publishers, 1980) at 136-37.
82 See S. Delacourt, “LeBlanc named governor-general Manning calls choice ‘unwise’” The Globe and 
Mail (23 November 1994) A 1 ; “Manning: The office is in decline” The Globe and Mail (25 November 
1994) A23; R. M. Lee, “A lapdog in Rideau Hall, a return to cronyism in the House” The Globe and 
Mail (26 November 1994) D2; W. Thorsell, “Patronage appointments have no place in ‘new politics’” 
The Globe and Mail (26 November 1994) D6.
83 See D.E..Smith, The Invisible Crown: The First Principle o f  Canadian Government (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995) at 60.
84 Ward, supra note 57 at 191.
85 Various proposals have been made for the depoliticization of the office of the Governor General. See 
e.g. Ward, supra note 57 at 193 (suggesting that the risk of particular appointments would be reduced 
by consulting the opposition); D. Blundell, “Some reflections upon the office of Governor-General in 
New Zealand” (1980) 10 Victoria U. o f Wellington L. R. 197 at 205 (same); “The last act of patriation” 
The Globe and Mail (23 November 1994) A22 (suggesting that upon the death or abdication of the 
Queen, a Governor General elected by the 150 or so Companions of the Order of Canada replace her as 
a head of state). Outside of Canada, the suggestion has been made that an available Prince of Wales 
could be appointed Governor General. See C. Howard, Australian Federal Constitutional Law, 3d ed. 
(Sydney: The Law Book Co. Ltd., 1985) at 115 (Australia); D. Blundell, supra (New Zealand). This 
position would be untenable in Canada for various reasons. A non-Canadian Governor General would 
be perceived as a step back in Canadian independence. Moreover, the installation of a member of the 
British royal family would be anathema to many Canadians not of British heritage and could serve to 
exacerbate tensions with Quebec.
Clarkson as Governor General in 1999 was widely welcomed as a non-political 
appointment.86
Most of the scholarship arguing for the retention of gubernatorial discretion in 
appointing a new Prime Minister to replace a deceased one is dated in light of the 
strength of the prevailing convention that the Governor General must select the 
person chosen by the party as its leader.87 It is simply inconceivable that the parties 
would permit the Governor General to select a new (as opposed to an interim) party 
leader and eschew the party selection process.88 Thus, the assertion that the Governor 
General is entitled to the full support of party leaders in his or her selection of Prime 
Minister89 is false. Rather, the party leaders are entitled to the full support of the 
Governor General in their choice of an interim leader/Prime Minister. The only issue 
is whether the Governor General has any discretion in appointing an interim Prime 
Minister. Professor Hogg appears to waver on this issue. On the one hand, he states 
that it is certain that the government party would want to choose its successor and 
the Governor General would be obliged to follow that choice.90 However, he also 
accepts the possibility of the Governor General appointing a caretaker Prime 
Minister until the party made its choice. However, he states that even here, the party 
would likely want to designate the interim Prime Minister.91 Andrew Heard captures 
the issue in asserting that the Governor General would only have a role if the party 
failed to make a choice; but in such a scenario no rules exist to guide the governor's 
choice.92 It is to the construction of possible rules that we now turn.
86See “A Strong Nationalist for Governor General” The Toronto Star (9 Sept. 1999); “Choosing a 
Canadian” The Globe and Mail (9 Sept. 1999) A 14; G. Fraser, “Reaction generally positive to Clarkson 
appointment” The Globe and Mail (9 Sept. 1999) A2; but see “A governor-general for half the country” 
National Post (9 Sept. 1999). It is still too early to tell whether the Clarkson appointment is simply a 
patronage interregnum or the beginning of the rehabilitation o f Rideau Hall. On my hopes for the 
rehabilitation of the governor-general, see Adam M. Dodek, “When the governor-general mattered” 
Ottawa Citizen (6 April 1999).
87 See Heard, supra note 13 at 25.
88 See Hogg, supra note 2 at 259. Professor Hogg states that the assertion that the Governor General 
retains prerogative powers on the scale of those exercised in 1896 is simply wrong. “It would be 
intolerable to Canadians if the Queen or the Governor General were actually to exercise significant 
governmental power.” Ibid. at 260.
89 See Mallory,, supra note 15 at 51.
90 See Hogg, supra note 2 at 259.
91 Ibid.
92 Heard, supra note 13 at 25.
Models of Succession in Canada
It should now be clear that the core of the Canadian succession problem lies in the 
period of uncertainty between the death of the Prime Minister and the election of a 
new party leader by the party electoral machinery, some several months down the 
road. There is no question that once the party selects its leader, the Governor General 
has no discretion and must summon this person to Rideau Hall. The problem is what 
happens in the interim. Because this “interim” is a matter of months and not days or 
even weeks,93 the selection of the interim leader/Prime Minister is important to the 
constitution and to the country. Indeed, a so-called “interim Prime Minister” could 
end up leading the country for a longer period than some of our Prime Ministers 
have done.94 This section will identify and evaluate various alternative methods of 
selection of an interim Prime Minister until the party electoral machinery has run its 
course.
Cabinet Vote — The Quebec Model
The first alternative is what I will call “the Quebec model of succession.” Under this 
model, the cabinet of a deceased Prime Minister selects one of its own to ascend to 
the Prime Ministership. This was the model of succession under Union Nationale 
governments in Quebec upon the death of Maurice Duplessis and his successor Paul 
Sauvé.95 When Mr. Duplessis died, Mr. Sauvé emerged as successor and the cabinet 
ministers recommended his selection to the Lt. Governor who then called upon Mr. 
Sauvé to form a new government.96 When Mr. Sauvé died approximately 100 days 
later, no clear successor existed and a bitter internal dispute erupted which 
threatened to split the party. The cabinet again selected a successor, imposed its
93The British process for replacing a leader is much quicker than Canada’s. See Brazier, supra note 31 
at 10-11 (describing process o f leadership selection as taking 2-3 weeks).
94 i.e. Sir Charles Tupper (May 1, 1896 - July 8, 1896) (69 days); Arthur Meighen (June 29, 1926 - 
September 25,1926) (88 days); John Tumer (June 30,1984 - September 17,1984) (80 days); and Kim 
Campbell (June 25, 1993 - November 4, 1993) ( 129 days ). See Guide to Canadian Ministries, supra 
note 7 at 35 (Tupper), 77 (Meighen) and National Archives, “The Prime Ministers o f Canada: 
Biographical Notes, http://www.archives.ca/www/com/english/pm/biographical_notes.html (last visited 
February 4, 1999).
95 The model also applied on the death of Premier Johnson in 1968. See Hogg, supra note 2 at 259 n. 
63.
96 See J.R. Mallory, “The Royal Prerogative in Canada: The Selection of Successors to Mr. Duplessis 
and Mr. Sauvé” ( 1960) 26 Can. J. of Economics and Political Science 314 at 315-16 [hereinafter ‘The 
Royal Prerogative in Canada”].
choice on the caucus and once again petitioned the Lt. Governor to appoint its 
designate, Mr. Barrette, as the so-called “party's choice” for Premier.97
The “Quebec model” has its admirers both in Canada98 and abroad;99 however, 
it suffers various conceptual and practical infirmities. First, as a matter of law, the 
cabinet ceases to exist upon the death of the Prime Minister (or Premier).100 Under 
our system of responsible government, a Government or Ministry exists only so long 
as there is a Prime Minister, because only the Prime Minister can offer advice to the 
Governor General.101 Therefore, the cabinet cannot meet unless there is a Prime 
Minister. The Prime Minister need not be present at a cabinet meeting, but must be 
alive in order to give the cabinet “constitutional life.”102 Thus, despite the apparent 
widespread belief that the cabinet has a “constitutional duty” to choose a successor, 
such a position is constitutionally untenable.103
As a matter of practical politics, the Quebec model only works if there is a clear 
successor, as was the case when Mr. Sauvé succeeded Mr. Duplessis. When no 
obvious successor exists, as was the case when Mr. Barrette succeeded Mr. Sauvé, 
the Quebec model fails. Having a deeply divided cabinet choose a successor runs the 
risk of fracturing the government and the party by installing a leader who may not 
truly have the confidence of the caucus.104
97 See ibid. at 317-18.
98 Professor Hogg has suggested it as means of selecting an interim Prime Minister. See Hogg, supra 
note 2 at 259.
99 It is the policy of the British Labour Party, See Labour Party, Standing Order 5(3Xa) contained in 
Brazier, supra note 31 at 309. It is also the Israeli way, enshrined in Israel's Basic Law: The 
Government. See A.M. Dodek, supra note 6 at 62, 66. Caucus selection also was used in South Africa 
in 1989 after the ouster o f P.W. Botha, with F.W. de Klerk emerging as the new leader of the National 
Party by a vote o f 69 to 61. See T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, 4th ed. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1991) at 443.
100 See Heard, supra note 13 at 49.
101 See ibid.
102 See Mallory, “The Royal Prerogative in Canada” supra note 95 at 316.
103 See ibid. (describing the belief expressed in the press at the time regarding the cabinet's duty); a 
former senior official in the Mulroney government confided in me that he believed in the event of the 
Prime Minister’s death, the cabinet would choose a successor).
104 See MacKinnon, supra note 75 at 125. What I have termed the “Quebec model” is the constitutionally 
prescribed mode o f succession upon a vacancy in the office of the Prime Minister in Israel. This was the 
operative procedure when Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated in November 1996 and the cabinet 
chose Foreign Minister Shimon Peres as his successor. As I have argued, this model o f succession
The Quebec model appears to envision the selection of a permanent successor 
rather than an interim leader of the party. This was certainly the way it operated in 
the succession events of 1959-60 in Quebec.105 Such a prospect creates the 
possibility that the mandated selection process for a new leader would be a pro 
forma exercise. Eschewing the formal party electoral process in favour of the closed- 
door selection of a leader is simply no longer tenable in Canada because the 
principles of openness and participation have become important values which 
governments and parties flaunt at great risk to themselves.106
Caucus Vote — The Liberal Opposition Model
Another alternative is for the government caucus to select a new leader, whose name 
would then be submitted to the Governor General.107 We might term this “the Liberal 
Opposition model” because it was the process used by the Liberal Party between 
1873 and 1901 to select its leaders while it laboured in opposition.108 Since the first 
national leadership was held by the Liberal Party in 1919,109 caucus selection has 
been a fact in Canada, at least in national politics.110 However, in Great Britain, this 
model was mooted when British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was ill and his 
colleagues thought that he might die imminently. A contingency plan was hatched 
whereby if the Prime Minister were to die, the Labour MPs would have caucused
worked well in that instance only because Mr. Peres was the obvious successor to Mr. Rabin, just as Mr. 
Sauvé was the obvious successor to Mr. Duplessis. Significant strain would be placed on the Israeli 
system if the cabinet had to find a successor when there no obvious candidate existed. See generally 
Dodek, supra note 6 at 61 -62.
105 It is also the way it operated in practice in the succession after the death o f Prime Minister Rabin in 
Israel. The night of Mr. Rabin's assassination, Mr. Peres' cabinet colleagues selected him as the Acting 
Prime Minister. Then the Labour Party selected him as their candidate to form a new Government. Then 
the President called upon Mr. Peres to form a new government and he became Prime Minister, losing 
the “acting” title. See Dodek, supra note 6 at 62-64.
106 See generally Courtney, Do Conventions Matter?, supra note 33 at 7 (“The move from caucus to 
convention introduced and then nurtured a democratic and representational ethic in Canadian politics 
from which clearly there could be no turning back.”).
107 On this suggestion, see E. Forsey, “The Courts and the Conventions of the Constitution” supra note
5 at 20.
108 See Courtney, Selection o f  National Party Leaders in Canada, supra note 25 at 44-51,53.
109 See ibid. at 59.
110 This process has been used, as well, in provincial politics, most recently when the government caucus 
in New Brunswick appointed an interim premier to replace Frank McKenna upon his sudden resignation. 
See “Interim Premier Vows to Stay Course in New Brunswick” Times Colonist (9 October 1997) A 13.
and voted until they selected a new leader. The Queen had apparently approved of 
this plan."1
The “Liberal Opposition” model has the virtue of being more democratic than 
other possibilities such as the Quebec model or Governor General discretion. It has 
the potential to work well as was demonstrated in the smooth transition of power 
after the sudden resignation of New Brunswick Premier Frank McKenna in 1997.112 
It has the virtue of providing an interim leader with broad-based party support to 
lead the nation. However, the key problem with this model is that it relies on the 
serendipity of circumstances: it works well when a consensus exists on an interim 
leader in an ordinary situation, especially when the party is in opposition.113 But, this 
model is untested and unpredictable. Its use might prove to be imprudent if a Prime 
Minister had to be replaced at a critical juncture.
Party Executive
The next model is the current model for replacement of a party leader who has 
vacated office for any reason: selection of an interim leader by the party executive 
This model appears to have the virtue of speed in selection since, in the modern age 
of teleconferencing, party executives can caucus quickly. However, several concerns 
exist. First, this model appears to be best suited for the selection of a caretaker party 
leader rather than a caretaker Prime Minister. This model suffers some of the same 
major deficiencies as Governor General discretion: it is undemocratic, unpredictable, 
uncertain and lacks transparency. Basically, it is a continuation of closed-door 
backroom politics by party elites. As such, this model offends current notions of how 
our Constitution should operate. No compelling reason exists to tolerate the 
continuation of the party elite decision-making in this crucial area, especially when 
a better solution exists.
Other Proposals
We could envision a model of succession whereby a particular ministry is designated 
whose office holder would automatically become the interim Prime Minister. We
111 See Brazier, supra note 31 at 12 n. 23.
112 See “Interim Premier Vows to Stay Course in New Brunswick” supra note 110 at A 13.
113 As was the case when the Tory caucus selected Elsie Wayne as interim leader after the resignation 
of Jean Charest. See G. Fraser, “Conservatives set sights on Reform” The Globe and Mail (2 April 1998) 
A5.
could look to the Minister of Finance or External Affairs to stand in for an absent or 
vacant premier. However, this proposal does not make sense for Canada. In this 
country, some cabinet ministries are undoubtedly more important than others, but 
the personality of the office holder, the minister's relationship with the Prime 
Minister and the happenstance of politics combine to determine the profile and 
influence of the department. Canadian Prime Ministers do not tend to step into 24 
Sussex Drive from any one particular portfolio, rather they have emerged from 
various backgrounds.114
It has been suggested in Great Britain that it would be preferable to develop a 
convention that a cabinet minister who could not possibly be a leadership contender 
ought to preside over the government during the period between death of the Prime 
Minister and selection of a successor.115 This selection may make sense in the British 
context but it raises numerous problems in Canada. First, there is an obvious 
difficulty in determining with certainty that a particular politician would not be a 
leadership candidate. Canadian parties tend to recycle their leaders so that selecting 
a party “elder statesman” who may be a former leader or Prime Minister (such as Joe 
Clark) may not be a solution. Second, because Canadian political leaders emerge 
from different posts, it would be impossible to designate a cabinet portfolio whose 
office holder could not be a leadership candidate. This suggestion would have to rely 
on the declarations of the potential caretaker Prime Minister excluding himself or 
herself from a leadership convention.
Finally, the suggestion for a non-partisan caretaker may have a certain virtue in 
Great Britain where the party leader selection process takes a few weeks; but here 
that virtue is overshadowed by the uncertainties of determining who this person 
would be and the greater power that the person would hold as Prime Minister for a 
period of months, not weeks or days. A self-declared non-contender may still raise
114 Canadian Prime Ministers have held various portfolios before becoming first minister: Lester Pearson 
(External Affairs); Pierre Trudeau (Parliamentary Secretary, Justice); Joe Clark (no ministerial 
experience); John Turner (Parliamentary Secretary, Registrar General, Solicitor General, Finance, 
Justice, Consumer and Corporate Affairs); Brian Mulroney (no ministerial experience); Kim Campbell 
(Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Justice, Defence); and Jean Chrétien (Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, National Revenue, President of the Treasury Board, Industry, Trade and 
Commerce, Finance, Justice, Deputy Prime Minister, etc.). See Guide to Canadian Ministries, supra note
7 at 238 (Mr. Chrétien), 239 (Mr. Clark), 292 (Mr. Pearson), 307 (Mr. Trudeau), 308 (Mr. Turner) and 
Prime Ministers o f Canada, <http://cnet.unb.ca/achn/pme/jamcb.htm> (last visited February 4,1999); 
PremiersMinistres/Prime Ministers http://www.rescol.ca/collections/discourspm/(last visited February 
4, 1999).
115 Bogdanor, supra note 24 at 89 (suggesting the Lord Chancellor for such a job).
doubts among her or his colleagues who are angling for the leadership position. 
Moreover, because of the length of time that this person would hold the reins of 
power, it is likely that factions within the government party would fight hard to 
install their man or woman in a position of power during a leadership battle.
The nineteenth-century British constitutional scholar Walter Bagehot proposed 
the idea that the House of Commons elect the Prime Minister in much the same way 
as it elects the Speaker. Under Bagehot's proposal, whenever a vacancy occurs in the 
premiership, the members of the House may nominate one of their members to 
become the Prime Minister. After an interval of ten days or two weeks, the House 
would meet and vote until a Prime Minister was selected.116 This proposal could be 
adapted for use only in crisis and with the interval between nomination and selection 
truncated so as to minimize any gap. Bagehot's proposal would effect a radical shift 
from the gabinet, party membership and the backrooms to the floor of the House of 
Commons. It has the indisputable virtues of openness and taking Parliament 
seriously. However, Bagehot's proposal is more a propos the 19th century than the 
2 1st. In Bagehot's time, party affiliations were much looser. In Canada today, parties 
usually come to the floor of the House of Commons as a unified front. The debate 
and decision-making occurs in caucus or cabinet. No party would support a proposed 
reform that threatened to take power out of the hands of the party and share it with 
other members o f the House. As a practical matter, the selection of a party 
leader/Prime Minister would be made in caucus, the party whip would impose party 
discipline and the House of Commons would then confirm the caucus selection. It 
is inconceivable that a government party would allow the names of more than one 
of its members to be mooted on the floor of a House vote, because such an 
occurrence would create the possibility of the election of a Prime Minister from the 
opposition benches who would not be able to command the support of a majority of 
the members of the House.
Developing a Canadian Model of Succession
The Canadian Constitution has developed in a very Burkean manner throughout our 
history, adapting to reflect the needs and changes in Canadian politics. One of the 
more recent changes in our Constitution has been the development of the office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister. This office has no standing in law and carries no 
statutory or formal duties. Basically, the designation of “Deputy Prime Minister” is 
strictly an honourary title conferred at the discretion of the Prime Minister on a
1,6 See W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1997) at 37.
member of the Cabinet. However, since Pierre Trudeau designated Allan MacEachen 
as his deputy in 1977, the position has become a constant in Canadian politics with 
the exception of the short-lived Conservative government of 1979-80. The Deputy 
Prime Minister may hold another portfolio, as did Mr. MacEachen (1977-79,1980- 
84)117 under Mr. Trudeau, as Jean Chrétien (1984)118 under Prime Minister Turner, 
Erik Nielsen (1984-86)'19 and Don Mazankowski (1986-93)120 under Prime Minister 
Mulroney, Jean Charest (1993)121 under Prime Minister Kim Campbell, and Sheila 
Copps (1993-97)122 under Prime Minister Chrétien. Alternatively, the Deputy Prime 
Minister may be the sole designation of the office holder as has been the case with 
Herb Gray (1997-) under Prime Minister Chrétien.123 In any case, one of the 
responsibilities of the Deputy Prime Minister, perhaps the only one that can be 
identified with certainty, is to act for the Prime Minister in his or her absence. An 
Order-in-Council sets out a list of ministers to act for the Prime Minister if he or she 
is absent from the National Capital region or otherwise unable to perform the 
functions of the office.124 As discussed, the Order-in-Council is not operative when
117 Mr. MacEachen was President of the Privy Council from 1977-79 during which time he was also the 
Government Leader in the House. See Simpson, supra note 81 at 10. During 1980-82, he was the 
Minister o f Finance and from 1982-84, he was Secretary of State for External Affairs. See Guide to 
Canadian Ministries, supra note 7 at 203-04; E. Lumley, ed., Canadian Who's Who 1998 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 774.
118 Mr. Chrétien was also Minister of State for External Affairs in Mr. Turner's short-lived government. 
See National Archives of Canada, Prime Ministers Biographical Notes: Chretien, <http://www. 
archives.ca/ www/com/english/pm/Chretien.html> (last visited February 4,1999); Lumley, supra note
116 at 225.
119 During this time, Mr. Nielsen served as President of the Privy Council, Defence Minister, and acting 
Minister of Fisheries. See Nielsen, supra note 81 at 292; Lumley, supra note 116 at 930.
120 See Lumley, supra note 116.
121 Mr. Charest was also the Minister of Industry, Science and Technology and Minister of Consumer 
and Corporate Affairs in the short-lived M inistry of Kim Campbell. See ibid. at 236; H. Branswell, “PM 
Takes Pains to Please Charest” Winnipeg Free Press (26 June 1993).
122 Ms. Copps served as Environment Minister ( 1993-96) and then Heritage Minister ( 1996-97) while 
she was Deputy Prime Minister. See “Chretien's Cabinet” Winnipeg Free Press (5 November 1993); 
The Globe and Mail (26 January 1996) A 1 ; Lumley, supra note 116 at 260.
123 See Lumley, supra note 116. Letter from Deputy Prime Minister Herb Gray to Adam Dodek (4 
December 1998).
124 See e.g. P.C. 1998-2065 (November 23, 1998); P.C. 1997-812 (June 11, 1997); P.C. 1996-1544 
(October 4,1996); and P.C. 1996-126 (January 25, 1996).
the Prime Minister dies or suddenly vacates the office and the acting prime minister 
cannot continue as an interim prime minister.125
However, the foundation for the establishment of a convention that the Deputy 
Prime Minister should accede to the premiership upon a sudden vacancy in that 
office has already been laid with the allocation of responsibility to the deputy in the 
Prime Minister's absence. Since its inception in 1977, the Deputy Prime Minister has 
become a mainstay in Canadian governments. Moreover, this model has operated 
with relative smoothness in Australia with the deaths of Prime Ministers in 1939, 
1945 and 1967.126 In each case, the Deputy Prime Minister became the interim Prime 
Minister until the party selected a new leader.127 The Deputy Prime Minister is well 
suited to assume the temporary stewardship of the party and the country until a 
successor is chosen. Concerns raised that the deputy may not be able to command 
the support that the deceased leader did,128 will be ironed out at a leadership 
convention. The deputy will have legitimacy by virtue of being the choice of the 
former Prime Minister. In the unlikely absence of a Deputy Prime Minister,129 the 
Governor General should turn to the minister next in order of precedence after the 
deceased Prime Minister130 on the grounds that the order of precedence is essentially 
a ranking of the cabinet made by the Prime Minister. While this suggestion has been 
criticized for introducing “a needless rigidity into a constitutional practice which 
now possesses a commendable flexibility,”131 it offers a predictable and temporary
125 This is because the government dies with the Prime Minister. See supra note 13 and accompanying 
text.
126 See Winterton, supra note 6 at 38-40; Bogdanor, supra note 24 at 85.
127 What differentiates the Australian situation from the Canadian, is that in two of the above cases, the 
government was composed o f a coalition of parties with the senior partner holding the premiership and 
the junior partner the deputy premiership. It has been suggested that it is not suitable for the junior 
partner in a coalition to hold the premiership even on a temporary basis. See Winterton, supra note 6 
at 38-40 (suggesting that the deputy leader of the senior partner in the coalition is a better choice). As 
Canada has not seen coalition governments in several decades, this problem can be bypassed for now.
128 See Mackinnon, supra note 75 at 126.
129 Since the position was inaugurated in 1977, the only time a Ministry was without a Deputy Prime 
Minister was during the brief tenure of Prime Minister Clark from 1979-80.1 would submit that the 
position is becoming more firmly embedded in the Canadian Constitution as time passes, as evidenced 
by the fact that Mr. Gray holds no other portfolios other than the deputy premiership.
130 This suggestion was made by Professor McWhinney two decades before the appointment of the first 
Deputy Prime Minister in Canada. See E. McWhinney, “Comment” supra note 37 at 95.
131 J.R. Mallory, “Comment” (1957) 35 Can. Bar. Rev. 242 at 242.
solution to a potentially volatile situation while the governing party selects a true 
successor.
Turning to practical matters, what must be done in order to implement this 
proposal? The groundwork has been laid with the established convention that the 
Governor General will only select the party leader to become Prime Minister. The 
Canadian problem exists solely because of the possibility of a gap in party leadership 
during a critical moment. Thus, the responsibility for the solution to this quandary 
lies with the parties, not with the Privy Council Office. The parties could address the 
situation in one of two ways. The most simple and direct manner of plugging the 
hole would be for the parties to amend their rules to state that if a party leader who 
is Prime Minister vacates office before a new leader is chosen, the Deputy Prime 
Minister becomes interim leader of the party (and therefore interim Prime Minister) 
until a new leader is selected. Alternatively, the parties could decide to 
institutionalize the position of deputy party leader in their constitutions and appoint 
this person to succeed to the party leadership on an interim basis until a new leader 
is selected. Although some parties are moving in the direction of institutionalizing 
the position of deputy leaders, the position is too new and untested to provide a 
solution to our problem at present.
This simple proposal will ensure that the country is not left without a captain for 
any period. Until the parties implement such changes, the Governor General's office 
should issue a public statement as to what course of action it would take if a sudden 
vacancy should occur in the premiership. It should state without hesitation that it will 
ask the Deputy Prime Minister to assume caretaker responsibility for the government 
as an interim Prime Minister until the party selects a new leader. Such a move would 
put the ball squarely in the parties' court. Under existing party rules, if the Governor 
General would ask the Deputy Prime Minister to lead the country on an interim 
basis, the party executives would have the option of either confirming the Deputy 
Prime Minister in this role or installing a different person as the interim Prime 
Minister until the party electoral machinery produced a new leader and Prime 
Minister.
Conclusion
It could happen. In fact, it probably will. Sometime this century a Canadian Prime 
Minister may die in office and politicians and pundits will scramble because no one 
will have a clue what to do. Do we really want to speculate on what would happen 
if the Prime Minister were to expire during the next Quebec referendum? We simply
cannot afford to tolerate the current state of uncertainty that surrounds the 
replacement of a deceased Prime Minister.
As we head into the next millennium, we as legal academics should broaden our 
understanding of constitutional law and recognize that the Prime Minister is now at 
the heart of our Constitution. Succession is a constitutional issue, an important one. 
It is frightening to realize that no one — not the Governor General, not the Privy 
Council Office, not the political parties and certainly not members of the academy
— can state for certain what would happen were our Prime Minister to die in office. 
This uncertainty is intolerable because it is curable. The position of the Deputy 
Prime Minister has matured under our Constitution and it is ready and able to 
assume the responsibility of keeping the fire burning in 24 Sussex Drive while the 
governing party chooses a new leader for itself and for the nation.
